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0. Introduction 
 The idea of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double pan balance) scale.  The 
reasons for φ (Rφ) go on one pan and the reasons for ~φ (R~φ) go on the other. The relative 
weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two sides of the scale, determine the 
deontic status of the act.  This model, Single Scale, assumes 
that a reason has justifying weight for φ (pushes φ down 
toward permissibility) only to the extent that it has requiring 
weight for φ (pushes ~φ up toward impermissibility).  Thus, 
Single Scale is committed to Single Proportion: all reasons 
have the same proportion of justifying and requiring 
weight.  Values that always come in the same proportion 
are dependent variables: if you know the value of one, then 
you can calculate the value of the other.  
 To reject Single Proportion is to deny that reasons always have the same proportion of 
justifying and requiring weight.  For example, a standard account of supererogation holds 
the altruistic reasons have one proportion (equal justifying and requiring weight) whereas 
self-interested reasons have a different proportion (have justifying weight but no requiring 
weight).  When values don’t always come in the same proportion, they are independent 
variables: you must track them independently insofar as you can’t calculate the value of 
one from the value of the other.  If justifying and requiring weight are independent 
variables, then Single Proportion is false. 
 Many normative theories hold that justifying and requiring weight are independent 
variables.  Single Scale cannot represent such theories because of its commitment to Single 
Proportion.  My model, Dual Scale, can.  Because it relies on two scales, we’ll see that it 
has no problem representing justifying and requiring weight as independent (or dependent) 
variables. 
 Ethicists reject, for a variety of reasons, the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing 
reasons.  Nonetheless, such ethicists generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight.  
This combination is incoherent.  The metaphor of weight is committed to this minimal idea: 
as φ is pushed toward permissibility, it is pushed away from impermissibility.  I will show 
that this minimal idea entails Dual Scale.  Fans of the weight (force, pressure) metaphor 
should be fans of Dual Scale.1 
 Justin Snedegar (2018) offers a specific challenge to scale-based models.  He observes 
that they are committed to: 
Equivalence: Insofar as R is a reason against φ, R is a reason for some alternative. 
 
1 An object’s weight while on the φ-pan is just the downward force (pressure) it exerts on the φ-pan and the 
upward force (pressure) it exerts on the ~φ-pan.  Consequently, Dual Scale can easily be recast in terms of 
force, pressure, vector sums, etc. if that is your preferred terminology. 
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Take Single Scale, for example.  A reason against φ is represented as a reason for ~φ.  
Snedegar rejects Equivalence, and so he infers that “the balancing [scale] metaphor is not 
even approximately correct” (742).  If he’s right, then Dual Scale is false. 
 At first glance, his rejection of Equivalence seems right.  There are two children in the 
burning building.  Since you can easily carry both children at the same time, the cost to 
save the children is the same: you will be severely burned.  You can save one child (Save1) 
or save both children (Save2).  The severe burns involved in Save2 seem to be a reason 
against Save2.  Yet they don’t seem to be a reason for Save1.  After all, you would get 
those very same burns if you Save1.  As plausible as such examples seem to be, 
Equivalence is a conceptual truth.2  We will see that every reason against φ, by definition, 
plays the same functional role in fixing deontic status as some reason for ~φ. 
 In §1, I present Dual Scale and explain how it resolves the problem with Single Scale.  
In §2, I clarify the reason for/against distinctions.  Yes, you read that right.  There are two 
reason for/against distinctions, because a reason can have justifying weight for/against, and 
it can have requiring weight for/against.  In §3, I show how easily Dual Scale 
accommodates the various reasons for and against.  In §4, I establish that Equivalence is a 
conceptual truth.  In §5, I show that the metaphor of a reason’s weight entails Dual Scale. 
 The version of Dual Scale I present in §1 makes the simplifying assumption that there 
are exactly two options, often represented by φ and ~φ.  In §6, I consider the possibility 
that there might be more than one alternative to φ.  This possibility raises: 
The Which Alternatives Question: if R is a reason against φ and every reason 
against φ is a reason for some alternative (as Equivalence assumes), then which 
alternatives is R a reason for? 
Snedegar doesn’t think that scale-based views can provide a satisfactory answer to this 
question.  He’s wrong.  I will say a little about how to generalize Dual Scale to cases in 
which there are three or more options, just enough to provide a satisfactory answer to the 
Which Alternatives Question.  This generalization will reveal an important respect in which 
the reasons for φ can vary as you vary the alternative. 
 By the end of the paper, then, I will have clarified the relationship between reasons for 
and against, as well as have provided three considerations in favor of Dual Scale: (1) it 
follows from the metaphor of a reason’s weight; (2) it can represent normative theories that 
reject Single Proportion, such as the standard account of supererogation; and (3) it can 
weigh both reasons for and reasons against. 
 
1. From Single Scale to Dual Scale 
 In §1.1, I remind you of Gert’s distinction between justifying and requiring weight for, 
as well as forestall a potential misunderstanding of requiring weight.  In §1.2, I explain 
why Single Scale can’t represent the standard account of supererogation.  In §1.3, I 
introduce Dual Scale and show that it can represent the standard account. 
 
1.1. Justifying vs Requiring Weight for 
 A consideration has justifying weight for φ iff the consideration makes it permissible 
to φ in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing reasons (more precisely: 
 
2 White (2017) objects to the converse of Equivalence, i.e., if R is a reason for φ, then R is a reason against 
some alternative.  I will establish the converse as a conceptual truth too, so White’s arguments must go wrong 
somewhere.  For where they might go wrong, see Kiesewetter (2018: §III). 
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sufficiently weighty requiring weight for ~φ).  The fact that eating this cookie will make 
me happy has justifying weight insofar as it is a consideration that pushes eating the cookie 
toward permissibility.  A consideration has requiring weight for φ iff it makes ~φ-ing 
impermissible in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing reasons (more 
precisely: sufficiently weighty justifying weight for ~φ).  If stopping the car is the only 
way to avoid killing one of the children playing in the street, then you have a reason for 
stopping that has requiring weight, a reason that pushes not stopping toward 
impermissibility. 
 You’ll notice that ‘justifying weight’ and ‘requiring weight’ are (inter)defined in 
typical functionalist fashion.  To have justifying weight for φ is just to play a certain role 
in fixing deontic status.  It is to push φ toward permissibility.  To have requiring weight for 
~φ just is to play an opposing role in fixing deontic status.  It is to push φ toward 
impermissibility.  Something’s amount of justifying weight and/or requiring weight is a 
way of specifying which role wins the competition in a given case.3  This functionalist 
approach to reasons and their relation to deontic status will allow us to state precisely the 
relationships between reasons for and reasons against.  I will not defend this functionalist 
approach, except insofar as the cool things I do with it count in its favor.4 
 The difference between justifying and requiring weight is not a difference in kind.  It 
is a difference of direction.  There is just one kind of physical weight, but we can 
nonetheless distinguish between which direction physical weight pushes and what option 
it pushes in that direction.  If you put my phone on the left pan, it will push the left pan 
down and the right pan up.  It pushes the two pans in opposite directions.  Likewise, even 
if there is only a single kind of normative weight, we can distinguish between which deontic 
direction it pushes (toward permissibility or toward impermissibility) and what option it 
pushes in that direction (φ or the alternative).   
 Following Portmore (2011: 88-9) and Dorsey (2016: 166), I use a thick notion of 
requirement: φ is a requirement iff both φ is permissible and ~φ is impermissible.  I use a 
different term for Gert’s thinner, purely negative notion of requirement: φ is a commitment 
iff ~φ is impermissible.  Commitment to φ is what you add to permission to φ in order to 
make φ required.  Nonetheless—and in contrast to Dorsey (2016: 166)—I follow Gert in 
using a thin sense of ‘requiring weight’ that does not entail justifying weight.   So 
understood, an undefeated requiring reason to φ does not, by definition, entail a 
requirement to φ (both φ is permissible and ~φ is impermissible) but only a commitment 
to φ (~φ is impermissible).  Were Gert’s terminology not ingrained in the literature, I would 
have avoided this infelicity by replacing the term “requiring weight” with “committing 
weight”. 
 
1.2. The Problem for Single Scale Explained 
 
3 Gert sometimes claims that, if justifying and requiring weight were independent variables, then amounts of 
justifying and requiring weight would be incomparable (2007: 537).  This is a mistake.  Downward and 
upward forces are distinct but comparable: the downward force can be greater than, less than, or equal to 
upward force.  Contrary to what Gert himself asserts (2007: 536), justifying and requiring weight are 
opposing weights/forces to be understood on analogy with downward and upward force.  Hence, justifying 
weight and requiring weight are distinct but comparable: justifying weight for φ can be greater than, less 
than, or equal to requiring weight for ~φ. 
4 For further defense of this functionalist approach, consult Dorsey 2016: 8-12 and especially Gert 2004: ch 
4. 
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 Single Scale entails that justifying and requiring weight exist.  Justifying weight for φ 
is nothing more than weight that pushes the φ pan down, 
making φ permissible (in the absence of sufficiently 
weighty countervailing reasons).  So Rφ have justifying 
weight for φ.  They also have requiring weight for φ.  
Requiring weight for φ is nothing more than weight that 
pushes the alternative up, making the alternative 
impermissible (in the absence of sufficiently weighty 
countervailing reasons). 
 So far, so good.  But Single Scale doesn’t stop there.  
Since a reason pushes the φ-pan down (has justifying 
weight for φ) only insofar as it pushes the ~φ-pan up (has 
requiring weight for φ), Single Scale is committed to: 
Single Proportion: reasons always have the same 
proportion of justifying and requiring weight.5 
Single Proportion is a substantive normative judgment about the weights that reasons can 
have.  In my forthcoming, I argue that a model of weighing reasons should not presuppose 
Single Proportion even if it is true.  Here I assume that Single Proportion is false, because 
it is incompatible with the standard account of supererogation. 
 Liv can save the lives of five soldiers by jumping on a grenade, thereby sacrificing her 
own life.  Or she can remain in safety and allow the fellow soldiers to die.  Liv’s jumping 
on the grenade would be a paradigmatic instance of supererogation, of going beyond the 
call of duty (in a morally good way).  The standard account provides the following 
explanation: 
The lives of the five soldiers have both justifying and requiring weight, because Liv 
would be morally required to save the five soldiers if she could do so at no cost to 
herself.  Morality is other-centered, so Liv’s self-interested reasons lack requiring 
weight.  Yet she is permitted to remain in safety because her life has considerable 
justifying weight.  Since both alternatives are permissible and it is morally better to 
save the others, she goes “beyond the call of duty” in jumping on the grenade.6 
Single Scale can’t represent the standard account of supererogation, because the latter 
depends on certain reasons (altruistic ones) having a different proportion of justifying and 
requiring weight than others (self-interested ones).  The former have both justifying and 
requiring weight; the latter have only justifying weight.7 
 
1.3. Dual Scale 
 
5 Single Scale actually has a bit more flexibility than this (my forthcoming, §3), but the details won’t concern 
us. 
6 Portmore (2008; 2011: ch 5) is perhaps the clearest proponent of this account.  His account is assumed by 
Massoud (2016) and Archer (2016).  Similar accounts are given by Clark (1978), Curtis (1981), Muñoz 
(forthcoming), and Raz (1990: 94).  Raz’s response focuses on “exclusionary permissions” rather than merely 
justifying reasons.  Yet “exclusionary permission” seems to be an awkward way of referring to an undefeated 
merely justifying reason (Gert 2004: 107-110). 
7 Other theories which entail that justifying and requiring weight are independent variables include: the 
existence of prerogatives (Scheffler 1982) and mere permissions (Hurka and Shubert 2012); solutions to 
Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox (Kamm 1996; Archer 2016; Muñoz forthcoming) and Horton’s All or 
Nothing Problem (Muñoz forthcoming); and certain versions of satisficing theory (Tucker 2017). 
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 My model, Dual Scale, uses two scales to determine the full deontic status of an action.  
Permission Scale determines whether φ is permissible by comparing the justifying weight 
for φ (JWφ) with the requiring weight for ~φ (RW~φ).  Commitment Scale determines 
whether φ is a commitment by comparing the requiring weight for φ (RWφ) with the 
justifying weight for ~φ (JW~φ).  
The two scales working together 
determine whether φ is required 
(whether it is a permissible 
commitment).   
 Compare Dual Scale with the 
illustration of how JW and RW 
map onto Single Scale.  Permission 
Scale represents the same 
competition as the left side of 
Single Scale (JWφ vs RW~φ).  
Commitment Scale represents the 
same competition as the right side of Single Scale (JW~φ vs RWφ).  The only difference is 
that there is no bar between the Permission and Commitment Scale that forces JW and RW 
to be dependent variables.  In other words, the sole difference between Single and Dual 
Scale is that only the former takes a substantive, controversial stand on the relation between 
justifying and requiring weight. 
 Any balance scale model must assign relative weights to deontic status.  I work with: 
Permission Assignment: φ is permissible iff the justifying weight of all reasons 
for φ is at least as weighty as the requiring weight of all reasons for ~φ, and 
Commitment Assignment: φ is a commitment iff the requiring weight of all 
reasons for φ is weightier than the justifying weight of all reasons for ~φ. 
 By relying on two scales, Dual Scale can represent what Single Scale can’t: normative 
views that allow justifying and requiring weight to be independent variables (some reasons 
have a different proportion than others).  Liv must choose whether to sacrifice her life 
(Sacrifice) or remain in safety (Safety).  The standard account of supererogation treats 
altruistic reasons, such as the lives of the five soldiers, as requiring reasons (say, 500 
JWSacrifice and 500 RWSacrifice).  The account treats self-interested reasons, such as the value 
of her life, as very weighty merely justifying reasons (say, 1,000 JWSafety and 0 RWSafety).  
Permission Scale entails that Sacrifice is permissible, because the justifying weight of Liv’s 
altruistic reason is weightier than the non-existent requiring weight of her self-interested 
reason (500 JWSacrifice > 0 RWSafety).  Commitment Scale entails that Sacrifice isn’t a 
commitment, because the requiring weight of the altruistic reason is outweighed by the 
justifying weight of her self-interested reason (500 RWSacrifice < 1,000 JWSafety). 
 
(when assessing deontic status of Sacrifice) 
Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
500 JWSacrifice 0 RWSafety 500 RWSacrifice 1,000 JWSafety 
Verdict: Sacrifice is permissible Verdict: Sacrifice is not a commitment 
Combined verdict: Sacrifice is permissible but not required 
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Since the altruistic act is permissible but not a commitment (and so not required), one goes 
beyond the call of duty in performing it.  At least, one goes beyond the call on the plausible 
assumption that it is morally better to save the five soldiers than to save one’s own life. 
 In short, Dual Scale holds that it takes two competitions to determine the full deontic 
status of φ: it takes a single use of Permission Scale to determine whether φ is permissible 
and a single use of Commitment Scale to determine whether φ is a commitment (whether 
~φ is impermissible).  Together the two competitions reveal whether φ is required.   
 The above version of Dual Scale assumes that there are exactly two options, usually 
represented by φ and ~φ.  In §6, I gesture at how it should be generalized to handle cases 
in which there are three or more options.  The above version is simplified in other respects 
too.  For example, it may seem incompatible with the existence of conditions (enablers, 
disablers) and modifiers (intensifiers, attenuators).  Dual Scale is easily refined to make 
room for such things, but I do not have the space to explore, clarify, and defend all its 
various features.  I do much of that in my forthcoming and manuscript.  Here I clarify the 
relationship between reasons for and against (§2, §4, §6), explain how Dual Scale handles 
such reasons (§3), and use these results to argue for Dual Scale (§5). 
 
1.4. An Alternative to Dual Scale? 
 If Snedegar gives up his attack on balance scale models, he has the resources to 
construct a balance scale model of weighing reasons that may seem to be an alternative to 
Dual Scale and the justifying/requiring distinction.  The model would be stated in terms of 
a single distinction between reasons for and against.  φ is permissible iff the reasons for φ 
are at least as weighty as the reasons against φ.  To make sense of the standard account of 
supererogation, Snedegar could deny that every reason for φ is a reason against the 
alternative: Liv’s death would be a reason for Safety without being a reason against 
Sacrifice.  Sounds pretty good so far, right?  That’s because, so far, this alleged 
alternative—call it Dualplicitous Scale—is just a terminological variant of Dual Scale.  It 
uses ‘reasons for φ’ as code for justifying weight for φ (reasons that push φ toward 
permissibility); uses ‘reasons against φ’ as code for requiring weight against φ (reasons 
that push φ toward impermissibility); and denies Single Proportion, that justifying and 
requiring weight always come in the same proportion.8 
 Whether Dualplicitous Scale remains a terminological variant of Dual Scale depends 
on how it is developed to handle the issues in the remainder of the paper.  Be warned, 
though, that its terminology is apt to obscure.  It draws a single distinction between reasons 
for and against when there are really two (§2.1).9  It is no surprise, then, that Snedegar 
misses the conceptual equivalences between reasons for and reasons against (§2.2, §4), 
equivalences which underwrite the argument from weight to Dual Scale (§5). 
 
2. Reasons For vs Reasons Against  
 
8 In contrast to Single Scale, the alleged alternative makes reasons for and against independent variables; 
therefore, like Dual Scale, it needs a second scale to account for commitment and requirement.  The first 
scale determines the permissibility of φ by comparing the reasons for and against φ.  The second scale takes 
into account the reasons for and against ~φ: φ is required only if the reasons against ~φ outweigh the reasons 
for ~φ.   
9 So far, Dualplicitous Scale has no terms that correspond to my justifying weight against or my requiring 
weight for.  How big of a problem is this?  That depends on how useful it is to have such terms.  It seems 
pretty useful to me (see the end of §2.2; cf. the discussion of opportunity costs and benefits in §6.3). 
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2.1. Justifying and Requiring Weight Against 
 There are two for/against distinctions, one for justifying weight and one for requiring 
weight.  In §1.1, I defined the functional roles of justifying and requiring weight for.  These 
definitions imply the functional roles for justifying and requiring weight against.  
Justifying and requiring weight for/against are comprised by two general distinctions that 
cut across one another.  The justifying/requiring distinction specifies which direction the 
weight pushes (toward permissibility or toward impermissibility).  The for/against 
distinction specifies what is pushed in that direction (φ or the alternative). 
 Justifying weight always pushes something toward permissibility.  Justifying weight 
for φ pushes φ toward permissibility (§1.1).  Hence, justifying weight against φ pushes 
the alternative toward permissibility.  You can take an outside job offer (Go) or stay at 
your current job (Stay).  If you Go, you will live in a less desirable location.  The worse 
location has justifying weight against Go.  That is, it pushes Stay toward permissibility. 
 Requiring weight always pushes something toward impermissibility.  Requiring weight 
for φ pushes the alternative toward impermissibility (§1.1).  Hence, requiring weight 
against φ pushes φ toward impermissibility.  If you Go, you will break your promise to 
your nearby sister, a single mother, to watch her kids once a week.  The broken promise 
has requiring weight against Go insofar as it pushes Go toward impermissibility. 
 Reasons often have both justifying and requiring weight.  The promise has requiring 
weight against Go (pushes Go toward impermissibility), but it also has justifying weight 
against go (pushes Stay toward permissibility).  It wouldn’t be shocking if most reasons 
had equal amounts of justifying and requiring weight; however, this isn’t true of all reasons.  
To represent the standard account of supererogation, we assume that justifying and 
requiring weight can vary independently of one another.   
 
2.2. Conceptually Necessary Functional Equivalences 
 Single and Dual Scale are different ways of capturing the idea that an act’s deontic 
status depends on the reasons that bear on φ and the reasons that bear on the alternative, 
~φ.  Single Scale holds that there are four relevant categories of reasons: two categories 
that bear on φ (reasons for φ and reasons against φ) and two categories that bear on ~φ 
(reasons for ~φ and reasons against ~φ).  Four categories of reasons may sound like a lot.  
Yet Single Scale is problematic precisely because these categories are too few to represent 
normative theories which allow justifying and requiring weight to be independent 
variables. 
 Once we consider the possibility that justifying and requiring weight might be 
independent variables, the deontic status of φ is revealed to be a function of eight(!) 
categories of weight.  If we use ‘»«’ to represent against, we get: 
 
Eight Weight Slate 
 For Against 
Justifying weight justifying weight for φ (JWφ) 
justifying weight for ~φ (JW~φ) 
justifying weight against φ (JW»« φ) 
justifying weight against ~φ (JW»« ~φ) 
Requiring weight requiring weight for φ (RWφ) 
requiring weight for ~φ (RW~φ) 
requiring weight against φ (RW»« φ)  
requiring weight against ~φ (RW»« ~φ) 
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 There is good news for those who are starting to get overwhelmed by the distinctions.  
Everything in the against-column is functionally equivalent to something in the for-
column.  Every functional equivalence fits this pattern: hold fixed whether it is justifying 
or requiring weight and then vary the for/against and the φ/~φ.  For example, justifying 
weight for φ is functionally equivalent to justifying weight against ~φ.  They both push φ 









If an arrow connects two categories, then they are functionally equivalent (by definition).  
If there is no arrow between two categories, then they are not functionally equivalent, at 
least not by definition.11 
 When two categories of weight are functionally equivalent, any reason that fits one 
category fits the other.  For example, any reason that plays the justifying weight against ~φ 
role in a competition with a given alternative also plays the justifying weight for φ role in 
that competition, and vice versa.   
 According to Eight Weight Mates, nothing in the justifying weight row is functionally 
equivalent with anything in the requiring weight row.  This shouldn’t be surprising.  We 
are stressing the justifying/requiring weight distinction precisely because we want to 
represent normative views that allow justifying and requiring weight to be independent 
variables.   
 Recall the Liv case.  If Liv jumps on the grenade, she sacrifices her life.  Is (the value 
of) her life justifying weight for Safety or justifying weight against Sacrifice?  The choice 
may seem arbitrary.  That’s because the two types of weight, by definition, are functionally 
equivalent.  Insofar as Safety and Sacrifice are direct competitors, justifying weight for 
Safety just is justifying weight against Sacrifice, i.e., weight that pushes Safety toward 
permissibility. 
 You might wonder, “if justifying weight against φ and justifying weight for the 
alternative really were conceptually equivalent, then what’s the point in having the 
distinction at all?”  Consider an analogy.  Joe is taller than Jack is conceptually equivalent 
 
10 In case the table isn’t clear already, I will spell out the four conceptual equivalences that it identifies, 
starting with the top of the against column: 
(JW»« φ):  By definition, justifying weight against φ pushes ~φ toward permissibility, which justifying 
weight for ~φ also does by definition.   
(JW»« ~φ):  By definition, justifying weight against ~φ pushes φ toward permissibility, which justifying 
weight for φ also does by definition. 
(RW»« φ):  By definition, requiring weight against φ pushes φ toward impermissibility, which requiring 
weight for ~φ also does by definition. 
(RW»« ~φ):  By definition, requiring weight against ~φ pushes ~φ toward impermissibility, which 
requiring weight for φ also does by definition.  
11 If justifying for and requiring weight for are dependent variables after all, then those conceptually distinct 
types of weight might not be distinct.  Analogously, ‘Biden’ is conceptually distinct from ‘the President of 
the US’ but Biden is not distinct from the President of the US. 
Eight Weight Mates10 
 for Against 









to Jack is shorter than Joe.  Nonetheless, we find it convenient to have both ways of talking 
about the same relation of relative height.  The former emphasizes Joe’s side of the relation.  
The latter emphasizes Jack’s side. 
 A similar point holds for reasons.  Liv’s life counts as a reason.  If we want to emphasize 
how her life bears on Sacrifice’s deontic status (i.e., it pushes sacrificing her life away from 
being a commitment and so away from being required), we can say that Liv’s life is a 
reason against Sacrifice.  If we want to emphasize how Liv’s life bears on Safety’s deontic 
status (i.e., it pushes remaining in safety toward permissibility), we can say that her life is 
a reason for Safety.  Justifying weight for φ and justifying weight against the alternative are 
conceptually equivalent ways to talk about the same reason.  Nonetheless, their pragmatics 
are different.  The former emphasizes the reason’s relation to φ’s deontic status.  The latter 
emphasizes its relation to the alternative’s deontic status.12 
 
3. Dual Scale and Reasons For/Against 
 Eight Weight Slate tells us that there are four categories of weight for and four 
categories of weight against.  Recall 
the original illustration of Dual Scale 
(pictured again).  It tells us where to 
put the four categories of weight for.  It 
doesn’t tell us where to put any 
category of weight against.  
Thankfully, it is easy to fill in those 
details with the help of Eight Weight 
Mates.   
 For X and Y to be on the same pan 
is just for X and Y to play the same 
functional role in fixing deontic status.  If two categories of weight, by definition, play the 
same functional role in fixing an act’s deontic status, then they go on the same pan.   When 
we combine the illustration of Dual Scale with Eight Weight Mates, we find where to put 
every category of weight against: 
 
Where to Put the Weight 
(when assessing the deontic status of φ) 
Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
Left Pan of PS Right Pan of PS Left Pan of CS Right Pan of CS 
JW for φ RW for ~φ RW for φ JW for ~φ 
JW against ~φ RW against φ RW against ~φ JW against φ 
 
In short, Dual Scale easily weighs all four categories of weight for and all four categories 
of weight against. 
 
 
12 Kiesewetter defends the idea that a reason for φ always correlates to some reason against an alternative, 
but he does so under the label “Reasons Transmission” (2015: §IV, 2018: §III; cf. Snedegar 2016: §3).  This 
is misleading.  The correlation holds, but not because the reasons for φ transmit to something the property of 
being a reason against the alternative. ‘Reason for φ’ and ‘reason against the alternative’ are just two 
different ways to talk about the same reason. 
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4. Equivalence Established 
 Snedegar (2018: 738) rejects: 
Equivalence: Insofar as R is a reason against φ, R is a reason for some alternative. 
At first glance, he seems right.  Recall our earlier example.  We assumed that the burns 
you’ll receive if you Save2 are a reason against Save2 in its competition with Save1.  
(We’ll revisit this assumption shortly.)  It may seem implausible that those burns are also 
a reason for Save1 when Save1 results in those very same burns (cf. 732).  Yet he’s wrong.  
Eight Weight Mates reminds us that, in Save2’s competition with Save1, justifying weight 
against Save2 just is justifying weight for Save1.  Justifying weight against Save2 pushes 
its direct competitor toward permissibility, which is exactly what justifying weight for 
Save1 does. 
 The equivalence between justifying weight against φ and justifying weight for ~φ is 
non-negotiable.  We did not arrive at Eight Weight Mates by reflection on the scale 
metaphor, much less idiosyncratic details of Dual Scale.  We arrived at it by pointing out 
how the various functional roles relate to one another by definition.  Eight Weight Mates 
reports conceptual truths about the connection between the eight categories of weight.  
Dual Scale just provides a helpful visualization of their conceptual equivalence.  Recall the 
Where to Put the Weight table.  Since justifying weight against φ and justifying weight for 
the alternative go on the same pan, we can “see” that they make the same functional 
contribution to an act’s deontic status. 13 
 Maybe we are missing Snedegar’s point because we assumed that the burns were a 
reason against Save 2 in its competition with Save1.  That assumption itself presumes 
noncomparativism: a reason for/against φ might consist in facts solely about φ, regardless 
of how φ compares to other alternatives.  Noncomparativism holds, in other words, that 
reasons for/against φ don’t need to be differences between φ and some alternative.  In the 
competition between Save1 and Save2, the burns might be a reason against Save2 (and a 
reason for Save1) even though you get exactly the same burns in Save1.   
 Snedegar rejects noncomparativism14 in favor of comparativism: all reasons are 
comparative, i.e., all reasons are differences between alternatives.  On this view, since the 
burns are equally bad in Save1 and Save2, they aren’t a reason for/against either option 
after all.  No problem.  Equivalence is trivially preserved.  The burns’ lack of weight against 
Save2 is matched by a lack of weight for Save1. 
 In contrast, since you get the burns in Save2 but not in Bystander (just stand around 
and do nothing), the comparativist will hold that the burns are a reason against Save2 when 
 
13 I take no stand on whether Equivalence is true for the third role of reasons, (dis)commending.  That is, I 
take no stand on whether every reason that commends φ also discommends some alternative. Commending 
has a role to play in supererogation by making some acts better than alternatives with the same deontic status.  
Yet it is irrelevant to fixing deontic status.  In my manuscript, I argue that commending and Dual Scale work 
together to explain supererogation and resolve the All or Nothing Problem. 
14 Snedegar finds it odd to say that the burns are a reason for Save1 when you get those very same burns in 
Save2 and Save2 is your only alternative.  This oddness allegedly counts against noncomparativism because 
a theory of reasons should “explain the claims that we are willing to accept about reasons” (733).  I’m more 
optimistic than Snedegar about the prospects for a pragmatic explanation of why it sounds odd to say that the 
burns are a reason for Save1 (cf. Snedegar 733, nt 11).  When it is obvious to everyone that a reason for φ is 
cancelled out by the same reason for ~φ, then there is no point in talking about it in everyday decision-
making.  So when we are choosing between Save1 and Save2, we are going to focus on only those reasons 
that apply to one option but not the other.  With that said, I am neutral between comparativism and 
noncomparativism. 
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it competes with Bystander.  Yet this is no counterexample to Equivalence either.  The 
burns push Bystander toward permissibility (and Save1 away from requirement), which is 
the defining functional role of both justifying weight against Save2 and justifying weight 
for Bystander.  Consequently, the burns are both a reason against Save1 and for Bystander.  
Equivalence is again preserved.  Comparativism about reasons affects which 
considerations count as reasons, but it doesn’t threaten the claim that all reasons obey 
Equivalence.   
 Given comparativism, the burns are a reason against Save2 when Save2 competes with 
Bystander, but not when it competes with Save1.  This suggests that there may be some 
respect in which weight (and so reasons) are relative to the alternative.  We will explore 
this relativity in §6.1. 
 
5. From Weight to Dual Scale 
 Snedegar holds that we can keep the metaphor of a reason’s weight (741) while 
rejecting the metaphor of weighing reasons on a scale (742).15  Yet these metaphors are 
not separable.  They appear to be separable in part because the scale metaphor tends to be 
corrupted by Single Proportion and the assumption that there is only a single scale.  Once 
we drop these corrupting influences, we’ll see that Dual Scale adds nothing to the metaphor 
of weight—except a useful visualization.   
 A complete defense of this claim would identify all features of Dual Scale and show 
that they are entailed by the features present in the weight metaphor.  My defense here will 
be more limited, but it will get the job done well enough.  I identify the minimal idea of a 
reason’s weight.  I then construct a scale—Proto Permission Scale—that captures only this 
minimal idea.  I’ll then show that this scale is conceptually equivalent to Permission Scale 
and that Commitment Scale is just a substitution instance of Permission Scale.  Hence, if 
you endorse the metaphor of weight, you are committed to Dual Scale. 
 Suppose that a given bench press bar weighs 45 pounds.  That 45 pounds of weight just 
is the force that pushes the bar down.  In the real world, forces can push up, down, left, 
right, and everything in between.  The metaphor of a reason’s weight is just a convenient 
way to focus our attention on forces in two opposing directions: toward permissibility and 
toward impermissibility.  If you push something toward anything at all, you thereby push 
it away from something else.  Hence, the metaphor of weight (pressure, force) gives us this 
minimal idea: as φ is pushed toward permissibility, it is pushed away from 
impermissibility.   
 To construct a scale that captures only this minimal idea, start with a single balancing 
scale.  Ordinarily, the scale metaphor lets one pan represent φ and the other represent ~φ.  
Here, though, let both pans of the scale represent φ.   
Left Side of Proto Permission Scale: Let down represent toward φ’s permissibility 
and up represent toward φ’s impermissibility.  Hence, on the left pan we put 
justifying weight for φ (JWφ), i.e., those reasons that push φ down toward 
permissibility.   
As the left pan goes down, the right side goes up.  Consequently:  
Right Side of Proto Permission Scale: Up is toward φ’s permissibility and down is 
toward φ’s impermissibility.  Hence, on the right pan we put requiring weight 
against φ (RW»« φ), i.e., those reasons that push φ down toward impermissibility. 
 
15 Dancy (2004: 105) agrees. 
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 The resulting scale is Proto Permission Scale.  See the below illustration.  The 
minimal idea of weight is that, as φ is pushed toward permissibility, it is pushed away from 
impermissibility.  Proto Permission Scale illustrates this minimal idea on both sides of the 
scale (in an unhelpful way) but otherwise adds nothing to it.  To go from Proto Permission 
Scale to Dual Scale’s Permission Scale, we need to modify the bottom, top, and the middle 
of Proto Permission Scale’s right side.  Each of these modifications results from replacing 




 Bottom Right Modification to Proto Permission: For φ to be impermissible just is for 
~φ to be a commitment, per the definition of ‘commitment’ to ~φ (§1.1). So pushing φ 
toward impermissibility is conceptually equivalent to pushing ~φ (the alternative) toward 
commitment.  This conceptual equivalence vindicates the modification to the bottom right 
of Proto Permission Scale: replace “Toward φ’s impermissibility” with “Toward 
Commitment to ~φ”. 
 Top Right Modification to Proto Permission: By the definition of commitment, to the 
extent that a reason pushes φ toward permissibility, it pushes ~φ toward not being a 
commitment.  This conceptual equivalence vindicates the modification to the top right of 
Proto Permission Scale: replace “Toward φ’s permissibility” with “Toward no commitment 
to ~φ”.     
 Middle Right Modifications to Proto Permission: Two changes must be made in the 
middle.  The first is to the pan and the second is to what goes on the pan.  We modified the 
bottom right so that it is now toward commitment to ~φ.  We modified the top right so that 
it is now toward no commitment to ~φ.    These changes vindicate changing the right φ pan 
into a ~φ pan.  For, on the right side, it is ~φ that is pushed toward or away from 
commitment.  The Eight Weight Mates table reminds us that RW»« φ is conceptually 
equivalent to RW~φ.  This conceptual equivalence vindicates the modification to what goes 
on the right pan: replace “RW»« φ” with “RW~φ”.   
 Proto Permission Scale adds nothing to the minimal idea of the weight metaphor, 
except an illustration.  This illustration is unhelpful because both sides of the scale illustrate 
the same simple idea: as φ is pushed toward permissibility, it is pushed away from 
impermissibility.  Dual Scale’s Permission Scale is conceptually equivalent to Proto 
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Permission Scale.  Likewise, then, Dual Scale adds nothing to the minimal idea of the 
weight metaphor, except an illustration.  In this case, however, the illustration is helpful.  
For it illustrates how certain reasons relevant to φ’s deontic status affect the deontic status 
of φ’s alternative: as φ is pushed toward permissibility, ~φ is pushed away from 
commitment (and so pushed away from requirement). 
 To get Dual Scale’s Commitment Scale, start with its Permission Scale.  Swap φ and 
~φ and then flip the two sides of the scale (e.g., after the substitution, the left side of 
Permission Scale is the right side of Commitment Scale).16  For your convenience, I again 
give you the original illustration of Dual 
Scale so that you can see for yourself that 
Commitment Scale is the mirror image of 
Permission Scale after swapping φ and ~φ.  
We shouldn’t be surprised by the relation 
of the two scales.  A requirement to φ is 
just a combined deontic verdict of 
permissible to φ (determined by 
Permission Scale) and impermissible to ~φ 
(determined by Commitment Scale).   
 When we combine Permission and Commitment Scale, we get Dual Scale.  Permission 
Scale is conceptually equivalent to the minimal idea of a reason’s weight.  Since 
Commitment Scale is conceptually equivalent to Permission Scale, it too is conceptually 
equivalent to the minimal idea of a reason’s weight.  Thus, if you are comfortable talking 
about a reason’s weight, then you should be comfortable weighing that reason on Dual 
Scale. 
 
6. The Which Alternative Question 
 
6.1. Any Number of Options and the Relativity of Weight 
 Thus far I have made the simplifying assumption that there are exactly two options, 
usually represented by φ and ~φ.  Snedegar will worry that this simplifying assumption 
ignores a challenging question for defenders of Equivalence.  When there is more than one 
alternative to φ, Snedegar (2016: 728) raises:   
The Which Alternatives Question (WhichAlt): if R is a reason against φ and 
every reason against φ is a reason for some alternative (as Equivalence assumes), 
then which alternatives is R a reason for?  
See my book manuscript for a complete explanation of how to generalize Dual Scale to 
cases with three or more options.  Here I just explain the two things you need to know in 
order to answer WhichAlt: (i) what it is for an option to win a tournament,  and (ii) that 
weight is contrastive, roughly, that weight can vary as you vary the alternative (i.e., the 
contrast).17 
 
16 Commitment Scale can also be constructed by going from the minimal idea of a reason’s weight to a “Proto 
Commitment Scale” and then to the Commitment Scale itself.  But going straight from Permission Scale to 
Commitment Scale saves us some time. 
17 Snedegar defends something similar to the tournament idea (2017: §3.4.3) and what I call ‘contrastive 
weight’ (2017: 7-8).  Yet, in his 2018, he misses the way that balance scale models can be combined with 
these ideas to answer WhichAlt.  Also, a word of caution: I think Snedegar builds more into contrastive 
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 Recall that, given exactly one alternative, Dual Scale holds that two competitions 
determine the full deontic status of φ.  A single use of Permission Scale determines whether 
φ is permissible.  A single use of Commitment Scale determines whether φ is a commitment 
(whether ~φ is impermissible).  The two scales working together reveal whether φ is 
required.  Let’s ignore the second scale and focus solely on how Dual Scale determines the 
permissibility of φ. 
 When the only options are φ and ~φ, Dual Scale holds that φ is made permissible by 
winning one competition with one alternative.  It’s also true, though, that φ is made 
permissible by winning a tournament, a pairwise competition with every alternative.  This 
latter idea is the key to generalizing Permission Scale to contexts in which there are more 
than two options.  The generalized Permission Assignment is this: φ is permissible iff, for 
every alternative A, JWφ ≥ RWA.  The metaphor of Permission Scale forces us to compare 
φ with one alternative at a time.  We compare φ with each alternative, and if φ wins every 
comparison, then φ is permissible. 
 To see that weight is contrastive, consider the Café or Kid Case.18  There is a single 
child in a burning building.  I have three potential options.  I can save the child and get 
severe burns (Save1).  I can just stand around and watch the events unfold (Bystander).  
Or I can keep my promise to meet my friend at the Café (Café).  If you had to choose 
between Bystander and Save1, then Bystander would be permissible and Save1 would be 
supererogatory.  When you also have Café as an option, Save1 is supererogatory, Café is 
permissible, but now Bystander is impermissible.  Somehow the addition of Café makes 
Bystander impermissible.  This is puzzling.   Consider the cost of breaking two fingers.  
This cost would justify not keeping your promise, but it wouldn’t justify not saving the 
child.  Intuitively, it takes a greater cost to justify not saving someone’s life (100 RWSave1) 
than to justify not keeping your promise (25 RWCafé).  So how can JWBystander beat 100 
RWSave1 but not beat 25 RWCafé?   
 The answer is that there is more JW for Bystander when Bystander competes against 
Save1 than Café.  This is easiest to see given comparativism about reasons, the view that a 
reason for φ is a way that φ is better than some alternative.  If you vary the alternative, you 
can vary the ways and extent to which φ is better.19  This is just what happens in the Café 
or Kid case. 
Bystander vs Save1: you avoid the burns in Bystander but not Save1.  We are 
working with the standard account of supererogation which makes self-interested 
costs very weighty merely justifying reasons (§§1.2-1.3), so assume that this 
difference has 500 JWBystander.  500 JWBystander > 100 RWSave1. 
Bystander vs Café: the burns are irrelevant to the competition, because you don’t 
get the burns in either alternative.  Since there are no other ways Bystander is 
better than Café, there is 0 JWBystander. 0 JWBystander < 25 RWCafé. 
 
weight than I do.  He seems to think it entails comparativism about reasons (2017: 8), but I don’t (see nt 19 
below). 
18 Earlier discussions of the Café or Kid Case include Kamm (1996: 313-5) and Muñoz (forthcoming).  My 
explanation of this case is essentially a more developed version of Muñoz’s (EV 9). 
19 If you endorse noncomparativism about reasons, then you need to rely on Eight Weight Mates (i.e., the 
conceptual equivalence of reasons for and against) to explain the Café or Kid Case.  When Bystander 
competes with Save1, the burns have justifying weight against Save1 and so have justifying weight for 
Bystander.  When Bystander competes with Café, there is no justifying weight against Café (the burns are 
irrelevant to that competition) and so no justifying weight for Bystander. 
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Bystander is impermissible, because it loses the tournament.  It wins the individual 
competition with Save1, but it loses to Café. 
 The Café or Kid Case illustrates that weight is contrastive: varying the alternative to 
φ can vary the reasons (better: grounds) relevant to φ.  The burns are a relevant reason in 
Bystander’s competition with Save1, but not its competition with Café.  Consequently, 
there is more JWBystander when Bystander competes with the former than the latter.
20 
 
6.2. Equivalence’s Answer to WhichAlt 
 When we generalize Dual Scale to any number of options, it says that φ is permissible 
if and only if it wins a tournament, a pairwise competition with each alternative (JWφ ≥ 
RWA for all alternatives A).  Since weight is contrastive, there may not be a single value 
for JWφ that applies to the whole tournament.  There is more JWBystander when Bystander 
competes with Save1 than when it competes with Café.  Hence, any general answer to 
WhichAlt must be stated at the level of pairwise competitions, not at the level of the whole 
tournament.  We can clarify this point by taking a closer look at the reasons involved in the 
Café or Kid Case.   
 There are three reasons at play: the life of the potentially saved child (Child), the 
potential severe burns (Burns), and the potentially kept promise (Promise).  When 
comparing Save1 and Bystander, Burns and Child are relevant but Promise is not.  When 
comparing Bystander and Café, Promise is relevant but Burns and Child are not.  When 
comparing Save1 and Café, all three reasons are relevant.  The following table sums up the 
reasons that are relevant to each tournament and individual competition: 
 
Competitions Relevant Reasons 
Tournament that Determines Bystander’s Deontic Status: 
 Bystander vs Save1 Burns (for Bystander/against Save1)  
Child (against Bystander/for Save1) 
 Bystander vs Café Promise (against Bystander/for Café) 
Tournament that Determines Save1’s Deontic Status: 
 Save1 vs Bystander Burns (for Bystander/against Save1) 
Child (against Bystander/for Save1)  
 Save1 vs Café Burns (against Save1/for Café) 
Child (for Save1/against Café) 
Promise (against Save1/for Café)  
Tournament that Determines Café’s Deontic Status 
 Café vs Bystander Promise (for Bystander/against Café) 
 Café vs Save1 Burns (against Save1/for Café) 
 
20 Contrastive weight does not entail holism, roughly the idea that the same reason’s weight can vary as you 
vary the context (or alternative).  Contrastive weight involves changes in which reasons are relevant.  Holism 
involves changes in the weight of a relevant reason.  Suppose some comparativist endorses atomism, the 
idea that a reason’s weight never varies, i.e., that holism is false.  Now consider the difference in burns 
between Bystander and Save1.  The atomist comparativist says both that this difference in burns is a relevant 
reason whenever the difference applies and that the reason when relevant has 500 JW no matter the context.  
The holist comparativist will agree that the difference in burns is a relevant reason whenever it applies, but 
she may insist that the relevant reason’s weight can vary as you vary the context.  Maybe its justifying weight 
is 500 in Café or Kid, as we assumed, but only 300 in some very different context.  In short, contrastive 
weight is compatible with holism but doesn’t entail it. 
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Child (for Save1/against Café) 
Promise (against Café/for Save1) 
 
 This table confirms Equivalence.  Whenever a reason applies to a given competition, it 
is both a reason for and a reason against.  For example, when we take a micro perspective 
and focus on the individual competition between Bystander and Save1, it seems arbitrary 
whether we treat the burns as having justifying weight against Save1 or justifying weight 
for Bystander.  Either way, the weight’s function is to push Bystander toward 
permissibility. 
 The table also helps answer WhichAlt.  When we zoom out, we see that the rational 
significance of the severe burns “follow” or “target” Save1, not Bystander.21  The burns 
have justifying weight against Save1 in Save1’s competition with Bystander and its 
competition with Café.  But they have justifying weight for Bystander only in Bystander’s 
competition with Save1.  In contrast, some reasons against φ don’t track or follow φ.  Child 
is a reason against Café in its competition with Save1; but Child is irrelevant to Café’s 
competition with Bystander.  Child is a reason against Café only insofar as Café is an 
alternative to Save1.   
 These considerations reveal that the answer to WhichAlt is not as simple as: if R is a 
reason against φ, then it is a reason for every alternative.  The answer is too simple, because 
it is stated at the level of the tournament.  When R is a reason against φ in some pairwise 
competitions but not others, we should likewise expect that R is a reason for some 
alternatives but not others.  Child is a reason against Café in its competition with Save1 but 
not its competition with Bystander.  It is no surprise, then, that Child is a reason for Save 
1 (in Café’s competition with Save1) but not for Bystander (in Café’s competition with 
Bystander). 
 It is easy to answer WhichAlt once we know that the answer should be stated at the 
level of individual competitions.  Equivalence actually gives us a completely general, if 
somewhat unhelpful, answer to WhichAlt.   
Equivalence’s Answer to WhichAlt: In the pairwise competition between φ and 
some alternative A1, R is a reason for A1 iff R is a reason against φ.   
When Café competes with Save1, Child is a reason against Café, so it is a reason for Save1.  
When Café competes with Bystander, Child isn’t a reason against Café and so it isn’t a 
reason for Bystander either. 
 
6.3. More Specific Answers to WhichAlt 
 Equivalence’s answer to WhichAlt is so thin that it isn’t very satisfying, and you may 
wonder whether more specific and satisfying answers can be given.  They can, but they 
presuppose some substantive judgment about the individuation and/or weights of reasons.  
Hence, any more specific answer to WhichAlt goes beyond the strict purview of Dual Scale 
or any other model of weighing reasons. 
 Given comparativism about reasons, it is easy to give a more specific answer to 
WhichAlt.  If R is a reason, it will be some difference between two alternatives.  Consider 
Bystander and Save1.  The difference in burns is a reason for Bystander, because it is a 
way that Bystander is better.  It is a reason against Save1, because it is a way that Save1 is 
 
21 Snedegar emphasizes that “paradigmatic reasons against” target the option they are against (2018: 729; cf. 
732), though I’m not sure we mean exactly the same thing by “target”. 
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worse than Bystander.  This same reason is relevant to any other pairwise competition in 
which the same difference applies.  The difference in burns also applies to Save1’s 
competition with Café, and so the burns are a reason against Save1 and for Café.  In 
contrast, recall the pairwise competition between Bystander and Café.  Since you avoid the 
burns either way, the difference in burns doesn’t apply and so aren’t a reason for or against 
either option (§4).  Generalize and we get this basic idea:  
Comparativism’s Answer to WhichAlt: for any alternative to φ, A, R is a reason 
for A (and against φ) iff R is a way that A is better than φ.22 
 We need one more distinction to answer WhichAlt if we assume noncomparativism.  
Let’s work with Toy Noncomparativism, which holds that all reasons boil down to non-
comparative facts about (the consequences of) a particular option.  For example, the burns 
are a reason against Save1 simply because Save1 results in those burns, regardless of how 
severely one would be burned in any other option.  This reason against Save1 is local to 
Save 1.  Local reasons for/against φ are located, or grounded, in φ (or φ’s consequences). 
 Given Toy Noncomparativism, not all reasons are local in this sense.  Remote reasons 
for/against φ are located, or grounded, in an alternative (or an alternative’s consequences).   
Economists distinguish between local and remote reasons using the language of 
opportunity costs and benefits (cf. Snedegar 2018: 729).  An outside job offer comes with 
a higher salary.  This higher salary is a local reason to take the job offer.  It is also a remote 
reason against, or an opportunity cost of, staying put.  To stay put is to miss the opportunity 
for the higher salary provided by the outside offer. 
 In the Café or Kid Case, the burns you get if you Save1 are a remote reason for 
Bystander.  They are a reason for Bystander that is grounded in an alternative, Save1.  This 
reason for Bystander is still a noncomparative reason.  The reason isn’t you get burned 
worse in Save1 than in Bystander, as comparativism would have it.  The reason is you get 
severely burned in Save1.   
 Every local reason is a remote reason, and vice versa.  A local reason against φ is a 
remote reason for the alternative.  Eight Weight Mates tells us that this relationship is a 
conceptual truth.  For example, the burns’ justifying weight against Save1 is conceptually 
equivalent to the burns’ justifying weight for Bystander (§2.2).  Insofar as Save1 and 
Bystander directly compete, it is conceptually impossible for the burns to be a local reason 
against Save1 without also being a remote reason for Bystander. 
 Nonetheless, local and remote reasons have different relevance conditions.  Since local 
reasons against φ are grounded in φ itself, those reasons are relevant no matter which 
alternative φ competes with.  Burns are a local reason against Save1, so it is no surprise 
that they are relevant to Save1’s competition with both Bystander and Café.  When a reason 
against φ follows or targets φ—when it is a reason against φ in the competition with every 
alternative—then we have evidence that the reason is local.   
 In contrast, there is no presumption that remote reasons against φ will be a reason for 
every alternative, precisely because those reasons are grounded in some specific 
alternative(s).  In principle, a remote reason against φ can be a reason for every alternative.  
When there are only two options, for example, every remote reason against φ will be a 
reason for every alternative.  Yet remote reasons against φ tend not to be reasons for every 
alternative.  Child is a reason against Bystander insofar as Bystander competes with Save1.  
 
22 Different versions of comparativism will cash out ‘ways to be better than’ in different ways. See, for 
example, Snedegar’s (2018: 736-7) appeal to the promotion or respect of objectives.  
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Yet it is not a reason against Bystander in its competition with Café.  If R is a remote reason 
against φ, then it is a reason for only certain alternatives: those alternatives for which R is 
a local reason.23 
 Let’s return to WhichAlt.  If R is a reason against φ, which alternatives is R a reason 
for?  Our discussion of local and remote reasons gives us: 
Toy Noncomparativism’s Answer to WhichAlt: If R is a local reason against φ, 
it is a reason for each alternative.  If R is a remote reason against φ, it is a reason 
for only certain alternatives: those alternatives for which R is a local reason. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper concerned two topics: (i) the relationship between reasons for and reasons 
against and (ii) how reasons are to be weighed.  Regarding the first topic, the paper has 
established that: 
1. There are two categories of reasons for (justifying and requiring weight for) and 
two categories of reasons against (justifying and requiring weight against); 
2. Every reason against is conceptually equivalent to some reason for;  
3. Reasons are contrastive, i.e., which reasons are relevant may vary as you vary 
the alternative; and 
4. A perfectly general answer to WhichAlt is available: in the pairwise 
competition between φ and some alternative A1, R is a reason for A1 iff R is a 
reason against φ.  More specific answers are available once we add auxiliary 
assumptions about which facts are reasons. 
Regarding the second topic, the paper identified the following virtues of Dual Scale: 
1. It is entailed by the idea that reasons have weight (force, pressure); 
2. It can represent normative theories that allow justifying and requiring weight to 
be independent variables, such as the standard account of supererogation; and 
3. It easily weighs all categories of reasons for and all categories of reasons 
against. 
 These three virtues fall short of a complete defense of Dual Scale.  I have not explained 
how to make Dual Scale compatible with the existence of conditions (enablers, disablers) 
or modifiers (intensifiers, attenuators).  Nor have I fully explained how Dual Scale can 
handle cases with more than two options.  Yet these three virtues do commend Dual Scale 
for further exploration.24 
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